STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT

MAKING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The United States has increasingly used economic sanctions in difficult, diplomatic situations over the last forty years. Such frequent use would seem to indicate that sanctions are an effective diplomatic tool. But many policy makers, statesmen, informed citizens, and media spokespersons have persistently argued that sanctions have not been productive, and that the outcomes achieved differed markedly from intended objectives. This study assesses key U.S. sanctions cases against nations that currently have pivotal, global roles, including China, Cuba, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia. U.S. sanctions against South Africa are also included to balance this analysis with a much noted instance of success. The study concludes with lessons learned and recommendations to enhance future uses of sanctions.

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INTRODUCTION

Economic sanctions are frequently used to support the United States National Security Strategy. The emergence of the United States as a world leader with a responsible sense of humanity and concern for human rights has led to increased American involvement in world crises. The urgency for world peace and global economic interdependency has encouraged the use of sanctions as the diplomatic tool of choice, particularly as an alternative to military intervention. When nations use sanctions, they generally impose them for political or symbolic reasons. Since the U. S. has relied increasingly on sanctions during the past two decades and seems inclined to continue this trend, it is essential that a framework for future application be developed to improve their strategic effectiveness.

In the United States military continual study and development of military doctrine and related concepts are routine strategic processes driven by changes in science, technology, and other elements of national power. A similar review should apply to diplomatic actions like economic sanctions in order for the United States to optimize its applications of power. This review of the past use of sanctions seeks to provide recommendations and alternative strategies that will produce results that are more effective in

2010 and beyond. This review focuses on sanctions used in several historic cases. It examines the lessons learned from both unilateral and multilateral perspectives. It then recommends ways for building strategies for effective uses of sanctions.

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions, an understanding of what sanctions are is an essential starting point. Richard Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, describes sanctions in a tactical and strategic sense. He notes that tactically, sanctions are imposed to immediately deter, coerce, signal, and/or punish the targeted party.[1] From a strategic perspective, Haass describes sanctions as predominantly economic, but also political and military penalties aimed at permanently altering political and/or military behavior of states or larger international entities.[2] The effectiveness of sanctions can best be determined in the context of their purpose: Did they do what they were intended to do, with minimal problematic collateral damage? For sanctions to be effective, a country, regional alliance, or international coalition must cogently and clearly specify at the outset desired outcomes of sanctions. Further, the cost of executing sanctions must be proportional to the desired outcomes.

Despite the increasing application of sanctions, many writers, analysts, diplomats, congressmen, statesmen, and others have questioned the effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions. A 1990 study of sanctions by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott reviewed 115 international cases; this study concluded that only one-third of the cases successfully achieved desired outcomes.[3] William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg furthered this study through an analysis that identified the U.S. as the primary sanctioner in 78 of 115 cases. They concluded, "despite the evident growing popularity of sanctions as instruments of foreign policy, the traditional scholarly perception of sanctions is that they are remarkably unsuccessful in achieving their stated policy objectives."[4]

Reflecting the mixed report card on the effectiveness of sanctions, George A. Lopez and David Cortright pose what seems to be a fundamental question: "Are sanctions a panacea for coping with the challenges of the post-Cold War world, or an effective tool for a new era of international peacebuilding?"[5] This question the can be best answered by looking at the U. S. as the world's remaining superpower and noting how it historically implemented and executed economic sanctions. The U. S. proposed and used economic sanctions with increased frequency during the last several decades. To evaluate the

effectiveness of U.S. imposed sanctions, this study uses key criteria including the origin, objective, and the existing political state of affairs to determine success or failure of U.S. sanctions in China, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and South Africa. The examples in China, Cuba, Yugoslavia, and Iraq represent a volatile mix of unique political circumstances and missed opportunities that have profound implications for the future. South Africa clearly depicts the success story of sanctions. Key lessons learned enable us to identify important principles, which would enhance the effectiveness and success of future sanctions.

CHINA

U. S. relations with China have been dominated by Washington's desire to foster creditable dialogue with a nation that has considerable power and retaliatory capability. China has the means to become another superpower that could challenge the U.S. and recreate a bipolar world. The current push for new global markets also identifies China as a great prospect for multinational businesses. Nevertheless, the U.S. has traditionally been deeply concerned about China's history of abuse of human rights and proliferation of missile and nuclear technology. Given China's importance, the U.S. has chosen a

careful and calculated diplomatic response. U.S. diplomacy has focused on unilateral sanctions tailored to political realities and aimed specifically against China's human rights and proliferation policies. U.S. sanctions (and threats of sanctions) against China have involved the threat of denying China's most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status and in refusing to share technology that China could use to design and manufacture missiles or nuclear weapons.

China's disregard for human rights during the June 1989 massacre in Tianamen Square aroused the American public and pressured U.S. leaders to respond in a firm, meaningful manner. The U. S. response to China's human rights policies and practices targeted its MFN status through the threat of sanctions. Sanctions targeting China's MFN status certainly revealed China's dependence on trade in American markets. Robert S. Ross, a research associate for East Asian Research at Harvard University, summarized the situation as follows:

> Advocates of sanctions argued that the United States had sufficient leverage to use MFN to compel Chinese leaders to accommodate U. S. demands. Indeed, economic sanctions seemed to be a powerful instrument. China's economic development plan depended on the acquisition of foreign currency to purchase the high technology China needed to become a global economic power and a modern military power. According to U. S. government statistics, in 1995 the United States was China's largest export market, attracting 32 percent of all Chinese exports. In contrast, China's market attracted only 2 percent of total U. S. exports. [8]

All indications suggested U.S. denial of China's MFN status would work to effect the desired change in human rights policy.

However, quite the opposite proved to be true. The U. S. only threatened to impose sanctions on China. China called the U.S. bluff, calmly seeking to determine whether the U.S. would indeed impose sanctions. China gained the initiative by making only miniscule improvements in human rights. From 1989 to 1994, these minor gestures of improvement were followed by a return to repressive policies. Ultimately, President Clinton's May 1994 decision to delink trade from human rights acknowledged policy failure.[9] This was a prudent move. In a statement before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, David Dreier argued that the cause of human freedom advanced in those instances where the U. S. did not employ economic sanctions against dictatorships.[10] In contrast, countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and Argentina, which were not the target of sanctions, overcame dictatorships and improved human rights while embracing economic reforms. Employing sanctions does not guarantee changes in human rights policies. Issues concerning human rights bring a very difficult and unpredictable factor into deliberations about nations' economies.

China's growing prowess with missile technologies also increased U.S. concerns for peace and stability in a dramatically changed world. The U.S. has worked hard to sustain a measure of stability in the Middle East, a vital region that

contains over 70% of the world's oil.[11] China's missile export activities threatened to produce instability in the region. China's export of missile technology to Iran before 1987 and apparent plans to export it to Syria and Pakistan in 1991 led to limited U.S. sanctions. These sanctions were limited by U.S. concern about China's potential as a superpower. Many in Washington believed that to impose unlimited sanctions seeking absolute compliance with U. S. goals would undermine U. S. interests for normalizing relations with China.

Despite the targeted nature of U.S. sanctions, they failed to modify Chinese behavior. In 1991, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the international ground rules to prevent the spread of missile technology, became an issue between China and the U.S.[12] China's acceptance of MTCR guidelines would provide a mechanism to control potentially destabilizing exports. After complex and contentious deliberations, China committed to MTCR in 1992. However, from China's perspective, U.S. export of arms to Taiwan in 1992 violated the 1982 U.S.-China joint communique regulating the quality and quantity of U.S. arms sales.[13] China countered this action by exporting missile technology to Pakistan and by refusing to participate in U. N. Security Council discussions on the Middle East. Ross

summarizes the U.S. quandary in attempting to impose sanctions on China:

> American credibility to sanction Chinese missile proliferation has not derived from the severity of the sanctions it has imposed or threatened to impose. The United States has imposed only limited sanctions on missile proliferation, so that the impact on the Chinese economy has been negligible. Nonetheless, the sanctions remind Chinese leaders that Washington keeps a watchful eye on their behavior, that it takes proliferation seriously, and that it is prepared to adopt the most severe, albeit informal and implicit, sanction should Chinese proliferation harm vital U. S. interests. That interest is the deterioration of the overall relationship and heightened adversarial relations.[14]

MTCR talks between the two nations resumed in 1993. China never acknowledged that it violated agreements on missile exports, and the United States never acknowledged it violated the 1982 communiqué.[15] A 1994 agreement only added further specificity to clarify the 1992 agreement; it does not include expanded restrictions accepted by MTCR signatories in 1993, which added missile deliveries of all WMD.[16] The U.S. lifted its sanctions in 1993, but much debate continues about China's full compliance with the revised MTCR.

It is thus evident that limited U.S. use and refusal to use sanctions against China served only as an innocuous interim measure. Clearly, the larger U.S. concern was for amicable relations with a potential super power. When U. S. credibility is high, which is a function of the gravity of U. S. interests and its cost of imposing sanctions, and the cost of compromise is low, China has been willing to compromise.[17] Unilateral

sanctions in China essentially failed when they included issues vital to China. Whereas sanctions tend to isolate in certain ways the targeted nation, since the Nixon era the U.S. policy for China has been to support her inclusion in the global community. Therefore, U.S. use of limited sanctions and threats of sanctions against China has contradicted the dominant U.S. policy of engagement with China. This suggests that a fundamental aspect to using sanctions successfully is the identification of clearly defined objectives which have overriding importance to the U.S.

CUBA

U. S. economic sanctions in Cuba have had a long history with key changes in their objectives over a 36-year period. Unlike China, Cuba has no immediate, strategic significance to the U.S. other than its close proximity to the Florida coast. Nevertheless, U.S. focus on Cuba changed in 1962 when the U.S.S.R. established a political alliance with Fidel Castro and delivered key missile stockpiles to Cuba that posed an imminent threat to the U.S. landmass. Consequently, U. S. national security interests led to economic sanctions that included a full blockade. Thus Cuba offers a unique case of unilateral

sanctions that were initially successful, but over time outlived their usefulness. Arguments continue to abound that support lifting these sanctions as well as opposing views that still see them as a viable means to force a change in Cuba's leadership.

With the Cold War in full swing, other nations within the Organization of American States (OAS) initially joined the U. S. in maintaining sanctions against Cuba. The U.S. strategy for containment of communism was supported by all nations within the Western Hemisphere. The Cuban Missile Crisis provided the impetus to take aggressive measures to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. Despite regional support for sanctions, massive Soviet assistance countered the effects of sanctions; the Soviets provided the Castro government with approximately $6 billion in aid each year.[18] Soviet support allowed the Castro regime to consolidate its control over Cuba. Nevertheless, the Soviets refrained from providing offensive military material to Cuba, which the U.S. would consider threatening.

Despite U.S. success in eliminating the military threat from Cuba, U.S. sanctions have remained in place for the last 36 years. U. S. sanctions have weathered waves of change that include containment, U.S. political defeat in Vietnam, détente and peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union in a bipolar

world, sudden changes in sanctions policy by the OAS without U. S. support, Marxist revolutions in Grenada and Nicaragua, and the final collapse of the Soviet Union. The mention of all of these factors dramatize that, during these 36 years, U.S. sanctions of Cuba could not have the same objective. Today, the absence of a Soviet threat to the U. S. and removal of Soviet support to Cuba strongly suggests that U.S. sanctions on Cuba are no longer warranted. If we seek to export democracy and economic aid to such former Soviet states as Russia and Ukraine, should we not do likewise with our southern neighbor? If the Baltimore Orioles can bring major league baseball back to Cuba, why can't the U.S. government bring normalized relations back to Cuba?

Over the years, U. S. focus has changed from its security interests to retaliation against Fidel Castro. At the start of the embargo, it targeted only Cuba and did not prohibit third parties from trading with the island.[19] Later on, the U.S. expanded the sanctions which have cost the Cuban economy an estimated $60 billion, according to a recent NBC news report.[20] Susan Purcell, a former member of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff, justly concludes:

> During the past 36 years, the strongest supporters of economic sanctions against Cuba have hoped, if not believed, that the sanctions would lead to the overthrow or collapse of the Castro regime. Measured against these goals, the sanctions have clearly failed.[21]

Congressional and public support for what have become unilateral sanctions against Cuba has taken divergent paths. The Cuba Democracy Act or, informally, the Torricelli bill, named after Democratic Congressman Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, was enacted into law in 1992 to further discourage trade with Cuba by prohibiting ships entering Cuban ports for purposes of trade from loading or unloading freight in the United States for 180 days.[22] Congress continued its hard-line stance on sanctions with passage of the Helms-Burton law in 1996, which penalized foreign firms doing business in Cuba in reaction to various European nations continuing trade in contravention to U. S. goals.

On the other hand, public sentiment, as measured in January 1998 by a CBS poll, indicates declining support for continuing sanctions against Cuba.[23] This softening of support is also present within the Congress: Representative J. Joseph Moakley and Senator Christopher Dodd both argue for a change in U. S. policy toward Cuba. Wayne S. Smith, a retired Foreign Service Officer who served in Cuba, believes that the key to improving relations that would eventually change policies to lift sanctions lies in finding ways to encourage gradual movement of Cuba to a more open society. U. S. policy toward Cuba, centered

as it is on the embargo, is both obsolete and counterproductive.[24] The Clinton Administration's most recent policy changes now reflect increased focus on developing closer ties with the Cuban people, but not necessarily with its government.[25]

Neither unilateral nor multilateral sanctions have worked in Cuba throughout this 36-year imposition. A key reason they failed was the significant support Cuba received from the Soviet Union over 27 years. Even with the demise of the Soviet Empire, Cuba has essentially weathered recent sanctions by alliances with European states that mitigate the negative effects of sanctions. A fundamental rule for imposing successful sanctions requires all potential sources of support be made unavailable to maintain pressure on a targeted nation. The U. S. imposed sanctions for the right reasons in 1962 as a national security matter during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Soviet economic support to Cuba and other actions in the region enabled the situation to become a multilateral security issue for the OAS. Nevertheless, increased desire for economic growth among OAS partners with key markets in Europe led to a gradual retreat. Now Cuba is exposed only to unilateral U.S. sanctions. With no apparent security issue, U. S. strategy now seeks only to remove a dictator who no longer enjoys Soviet support. Given

U. S. National Security Strategy imperatives for expanding democracy, fostering trade, and global markets, continued U.S. sanctions in Cuba are simply not consistent with current U.S. strategic objectives.

YUGOSLAVIA

The collapse of Yugoslavia offered uncharted ground for using economic sanctions. A violent civil war fought by three factions (Muslims, Serbs, and Croats) created an extremely complex situation. U.N. sanctions suspended economic aid from the U.S. to Yugoslavia; halted the import and export of all goods into Serbia and Montenegro; banned Yugoslavian representation at international sport and cultural events; and prohibited any financial transactions with Yugoslavia.[26] These sanctions sought to motivate a peaceful solution of the conflict among the three factions. Essentially, the U. S. and the European Union saw no clear solution to this crisis and resorted to economic sanctions rather than military intervention. Stephen Stedman, Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University, summarizes U. S. and European sentiments:

> To argue that sanctions contributed to ending the war does not imply that they were the optimal policy tools for war termination or that they were the normatively best tools. The critics of sanctions are

> right; there were more effective policy tools at the disposal of the United States and its European allies. But the effectiveness of those tools, whether the use of military force or hard-nosed insistence on established institutional rules of recognition, also required a degree of allied unity and commitment that did not exist. Sanctions then were a convenient tool not only for states concerned with appearing to be doing something for the benefit of domestic constituents appalled at the war but unwilling to risk blood and treasure to stop the killing. They were also convenient for states that felt compelled to act multilaterally but did not possess the unity and conviction to act forcefully.[27]

U. S. sanctions against the former Yugoslavia have been in place over an eight-year period from 1991 to 1998. Trade sanctions against Yugoslavia were lifted immediately after Serbian President Slobadan Milosevic signed the Dayton Peace Accords; however, an "outer wall of sanctions" remains in place against Yugoslavia that deprives Serbia and Montenegro of membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.[28] The global visibility of the Balkan Crisis, with its brutal episodes of civil war, ethnic hatred, and violence horrified the international community and prompted the U. S. and western European nations to impose multilateral sanctions. The United Nations Security Council thus endorsed sanctions to stop these atrocities. Certainly, the common interest in peace justified this effort. However, the sobering fact is that sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro did not prove effective. In April 1993, the General Accounting Office forwarded a report to Senator Kennedy summarizing the

implementation of U. N. sanctions in Serbia and Montenegro. The GAO noted:

> The sanctions have been violated and have not prevented some strategic products like petroleum, for example from reaching Serbia-Montenegro. There has also been hundreds of other suspected, but unproven, violations. The European Community and other member countries of the Council for Security and Cooperation (CSCE) have been less stringent than the United States in blocking Serbian assets. The U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee was not effectively carrying out its responsibilities for monitoring how U.N. member states were implementing the sanctions and investigating alleged violations.[29]

Despite the considerable toll sanctions had on the Serbian economy, support for the Serbs and their continual violence against rival groups in Bosnia stopped only when military force from Croatia and the threat of NATO intervention reinforced the sanctions effort in 1995.[30] These sanctions failed in part because they were weakly implemented.

The political dynamics confronting the United States in Bosnia included a tough mix of challenging circumstances requiring significant energy and resources. As the leader of a diverse coalition, the U. S. had been thoroughly engaged in OPERATION DESERT STORM, expelling Iraq from Kuwait. Continued pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace agreements remained a prime concern. Domestically, calls for quickly reaping benefits from Cold War dividends, further enhanced by an overwhelming Gulf War victory, became a favorite political and economic topic. With a massive military drawdown immediately over the horizon,

committing forces to stabilize Bosnia was not practical, especially given the volatility of the situation. There were also no clear signals that military force would work. A more vibrant and stable Europe certainly had considerable resources to offer, especially in political terms. However, the Europeans were cautious. Therefore, economic sanctions became the mutual approach of the U. S. and European allies. This compromise approach had predictable results. As stated earlier, violence in the region ceased only when the threat of military force from NATO reinforced the sanctions.

So a review of sanctions in Serbia and Montenegro reveals some serious shortcomings. Besides their lack of expediency, sanctions in this region suffered from a lack of enforcement, from their negative effects on surrounding nations' economies, from the hardships they imposed on innocent civilians, and from their unpredictable effects on states emerging from decades of communist rule.[31] Each of these factors triggered negative repercussions that have thwarted the sanctions or produced undesirable second and third order effects. Collectively, this host of factors clearly spelled failure for sanctions.

Sanctions in Serbia and Montenegro proved very difficult to enforce because the United Nations' depended on member nations

to implement and execute approved resolutions. To enforce sanctions in Serbia and Montenegro, the geography of the Balkan region necessitated cooperation from bordering nations: Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. As the GAO report observed, "neither the United Nations nor individual countries of the international community have provided sufficient assistance to frontline countries to help them enforce the sanctions."[32] Sanctions require stringent enforcement to succeed. Both declaration and execution require cooperative actions on the part of a consortium of nations. Moreover, cooperating nations that choose to support sanctions often pay a high price for such support. The nations bordering Serbia and Montenegro in fact experienced significant economic losses. Estimates of economic losses from the second half of 1992 range from $300 million in Hungary to $7 billion in Romania.[33] These losses cover only a portion of the entire period sanctions were in force. GAO conducted its own investigation and published findings in April 1993 after initial actions for U.N. sanctions resolutions had been adopted in September 1991.

States impose sanctions for political reasons. But it is often individual citizens who suffer the consequences. A targeted country's leaders and upper class often do not feel the effects of sanctions.[34] In most cases, working and lower class

citizens inevitably suffer the consequences. Hufbauer and Elliott suggest in a collaborative effort with Kanter and Brooks that it is difficult to identify circumstances where targeted sanctions influence policy without affecting innocent civilians.[35] To offset such collateral damage, they recommend:

> Finally, rather than searching for the rainbow of targeted sanctions that leave innocent civilians unharmed, it might be more effective to ensure humanitarian assistance is forthcoming in situations where basic needs are not being met. Nongovernmental organizations may be helpful in undertaking the actual delivery of key supplies, but may be financially strapped or may need help in transporting available food and medical supplies. In any case, the U.N. should take responsibility for trying to meet humanitarian needs. This alternative does not automatically resolve the dilemma of sanctioning a government while trying to protect innocent citizens.[36]

In Serbia and Montenegro, the civilian population suffered economic ruin as well as violence and bloodshed. Indeed the diverse origin of Yugoslavian culture posed unique challenges and exposed extreme hatred. Such latent hostilities counter efforts to reform and stabilize the region.

The nature of the Balkan culture, its evolution as part of a communist regime, and its sudden independence from Soviet rule at the end of the Cold War presented highly volatile circumstances that complicated any use of sanctions. Susan Woodward, an author and visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, offers an in-depth analysis of how sanctions precluded the implementation of constructive solutions in Yugoslavia. Specifically, the United Nations, the United

States, and the European Union took actions that contributed to the escalation of crises. Woodward concludes:

> From the outset there were two basic solutions to the wars in the former Yugoslavia: First, democratic regimes needed to be created throughout the territory. Second, regional economic integration (along the model of the Schumann plan for France and Germany and subsequent European Community) would be necessary to compensate the devolution of power to smaller nation-states. Only with the resulting freedom of movement for people, ideas, and goods; restored sense of security for minorities; economic basis for overcoming the animosities of economic decline; and political stability would new borders be acceptable and the new national dominant states be viable and stable. These solutions were prevented by the imposition and maintenance of economic sanctions.[37]

Key tenets specified in the U. S. national security strategy for promoting democracy abroad and bolstering economic prosperity were simply not supported by the use of sanctions in this case. Woodward's observations suggest that economic progress builds foundations from which societies that are more democratic emerge. In Yugoslavia, using economic sanctions only contributed to the detriment of its republics. In the final analysis, sanctions proved to be an ineffectual and simple-minded means of attempting to favorably influence a complex and volatile situation in former Yugoslavia.

A fundamental truth supports economic sanctions with multilateral applications as a means for effective imposition. The former Yugoslavia presented an example of the need to use multilateral sanctions. We should have learned how to use them as "part" of a comprehensive strategy and not the "sole" means

of strategy. Stedman insightfully observes the limitations of even multilateral sanctions:

> When they are applied multilaterally, without clarity about their purpose or underlying causal theory, important differences will appear very quickly about when and under what circumstances to lift them. Such differences pose one of the biggest difficulties in creating a sense of overriding sustained commitment to sanctions.[38]

U.S. and European hesitancy to act in Yugoslavia led finally to sanctions that only contributed in small measure to acceptance of the Dayton Peace Accords. Sanctions have been in place in various forms over an eight-year period. Continual outbreaks of violence in Kosovo from March 1998 to the present clearly reveal a need for a strategy that reaches much beyond sanctions. Military force has now entered the equation.

IRAQ

Iraq arguably offered an unprecedented opportunity for the use of multilaterally applied economic sanctions. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait galvanized worldwide support for economic sanctions as a means to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. This provided a prime opportunity for the "new world order" to exert positive influence for the common good within the United Nations context in a post-Cold War environment. Out of 159 members of the United Nations, 122 supported the Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and

authorizing military force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait.[39] The export of Iraqi oil presented a significant economic target for sanctions; loss of Iraqi revenue at existing production capabilities totaled $12 to $15 billion annually.[40] Sanctions also strengthened the coalition as a legitimate and effective means to benefit all participants. These sanctions set conditions for success in OPERATIONs DESERT SHIELD and STORM in 1990 and 1991.

U. S. political legitimacy as the world's only superpower greatly enhanced its leadership of the Allied Coalition during this crisis. The threat of global communism having dissipated, the next logical focus for peace and stability was the Middle East. This region contains about 70% of the world's oil; a fact recognized much earlier when the Carter Doctrine identified the region as a vital interest to American security and stability.[41] Iraq's aggression challenged the fragile state of peace in this region. Saddam Hussein's desire to monopolize regional oil exportation threatened the well-being of the other regional producers. Multilateral sanctions, supported by military power, became the strategy. Either Iraq would comply by withdrawing from Kuwait, or she would be economically paralyzed by the embargo against export of her crude oil.

The imposition of these sanctions significantly affected other key countries in the region such as Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, and Lebanon. As often is the case with sanctions, some offsetting means were needed to avert indirect effects to supporting nations' economies.

> The United States proposed an Economic Action Plan (EAP) designed to encourage support of the sanctions regime by those most affected - Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. The EAP provided about $20 billion in financial assistance (contributed by the United States, the European Community, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait). To ensure solid Egyptian support, the United States forgave $7.1 billion in Egyptian debt to the United States. While the front-line states were the main concern, the Soviet Union also benefited. Saudi Arabia gave the Soviets an unprecedented $4 billion line of credit in response to an urgent request for help from President Mikhail Gorbachev.[42]

Concern about the well-being of the Iraqi population later prompted humanitarian relief in the form of food and medicines through an oil-for-food program. This program enabled the Iraqi government to sell limited amounts of Iraqi oil to buy food and medicines for Iraq's common citizens. All revenue from the program went to an U. N. escrow account. Those funds, a maximum of $10.5 billion a year, were then used to import food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies through contracts approved by a U. N. committee made up of representatives of all Security Council countries.[43]

As finally constituted, the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq included several essential elements: The coalition came together multilaterally, alternatives were implemented to

mitigate ancillary effects to participating nations and to Iraq's own population, and collective will existed internationally to stay the course until Saddam Hussein changed his behavior. Given such favorable circumstances, one could conclude that Iraq would change its policy and attitudes rather soon.

Unfortunately, as experience proved, Saddam Hussein did not capitulate. His absolute rule of the country as a dictator stymied sanctions on all fronts. News sources report that his use of terror, rewards, and nationalistic sentiments enabled his regime to rise above any opposition. He easily won loyalty by providing jobs and other benefits to the estimated 1 million members and supporters of the ruling Baath Party.[44] His regime suppressed the Kurd and Shiite factions of Iraq to prevent the international community from having an opportunity to promote a possible insurgency. Used alone, sanctions did not change Iraq's behavior. Or at least they were not allowed sufficient time to cause the desired change. In the end, pushing Iraq out of Kuwait required military force.

In the wake of the allied military victory, the sanctions regime remained in place to ensure Iraqi compliance with the terms of the U.N. peace agreement. U. N. insistence that Iraq

totally abandon development and production of weapons of mass destruction met persistent Iraqi opposition. Military intervention became a routine means of enforcing sanctions. Eric D. K. Melby, who served as an economic advisor for the National Security Council, argues that both as a punishment and as an inducement, the post-conflict sanctions have not worked. However, they have prevented Saddam from rebuilding Iraqi military capability, which he would have accomplished without them.[45] Again, the strategy for use of sanctions must include plans for the use of other elements of power to obtain the desired outcome. Continued use of military intervention in Iraq with no-fly zones, shows of force, naval blockades, and bombing raids such as OPERATION DESERT FOX shows that sanctions enforcement is greatly facilitated by the use of military force. Iraq offers new frontiers regarding the use of sanctions as a tool of economic, diplomatic, and political policy.

U. N. sanctions have cost Iraq's economy $120 billion according to the U. S. Administration.[46] However, experience over the past eight years shows that the survival of Saddam Hussein's regime does not depend on economic prosperity. Hussein has continually demonstrated the ability to maintain power through weapons of mass destruction and military prowess.

Although sanctions have denied some of his goals, they have not changed his policies and actions, or removed him from power.

From a larger perspective, the application of sanctions against Iraq has enabled the international community to learn valuable lessons concerning the use of multilateral sanctions. The U. N. has emerged as the viable source of mediation that it was conceived to be when formed. Through skillful diplomacy and a shared assessment of the problem among its permanent members, the Security Council for the first time functioned as its founders had envisioned in dealing with a major threat to global peace.[47] Melby notes the complexity of the lesson offered by the U.N. sanctions on Iraq:

> Perhaps the clearest lesson that the case of Iraq provides is that a simple "success" or "failure" label cannot measure sanctions. Sanctions inevitably have a range of impacts that vary over time. Thus lack of clear success in one area does not necessarily mean sanctions have failed. In this, sanctions closely resemble other foreign policy instruments.[48]

Now the challenge lies in perfecting a strategy that may encompass sanctions along with other means to end the Iraqi crisis. The U. N. must work toward engaging nations to work collectively, using all available elements of power to bring the Iraqi situation to a favorable end. In the meantime, the U. S. must consider reevaluating its goals with respect to sanctions in Iraq.

The U.S. has acknowledged its condition for the lifting of sanctions on Iraq to be the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, along with previously stated objectives of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty, destroying Iraqi capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, returning Kuwaiti nationals and property, and financing Kuwait's reparations.[49] It is apparent that the objective of Hussein's removal has not been met. Additionally, our strategy has hinged on the expectation that insurgent factions would rise to power given the outcome of the Gulf War and the domestic unrest generated by the sanctions. David E. Reuther, a career foreign service officer specializing in Middle East issues, observed that the Iraqi people were accustomed to economic hardship as a result of the sacrifices they endured in the eight-year Iran/Iraq War. He believes that the sanctions simply force them to continue their "patriotic sacrifice."[50] We must now wait to see what are the results of OPERATION DESERT FOX combined with the continued use of sanctions.

SOUTH AFRICA

When looking for examples of effective sanctions, South Africa immediately comes to mind. The South African experience

was rooted in the manacle of apartheid as social injustice and a failure in human rights. Economic reprisals worked in South Africa; they were instrumental in bringing about desired changes in policy. Over a considerable span of time, the scourge of apartheid engendered worldwide support of sanctions, which served to isolate South Africa's government as a violator of human rights and dignity. Clearly, sanctions succeeded in bringing about favorable political change in South Africa.

U.S. political strength accorded it the means to stand for what was morally right in South Africa; however, it initially lacked the will to act. Economically, the U.S. and its allies enjoyed lucrative profits from investments in the country, its open policy of apartheid notwithstanding. The rate of return to U. S. investors in South Africa was 29 percent in 1980 and 19 percent in 1981, several percentage points higher than worldwide average rates of return.[51] Despite U. N. efforts to impose sanctions in 1962, key vetoes within the Security Council by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France precluded such action.[52] During this time, the U. S., U. K., and Japan were absorbing 51 percent of South Africa's exports, while the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France and Italy accounted for another 19 percent.[53] Clearly, the U. S. and its allies

ignored the human relevance of apartheid, attracted as they were to a very profitable market.

Irrespective of the political and hegemonic influences in the U.N. Security Council, conditions in South Africa generated internal domestic opposition that would benefit from sanctions. The South African experience witnessed the emergence of a small grassroots movement that began with anti-apartheid activists who strengthened their cause through appeals to small segments of American society such as universities, churches, small communities, civil rights organizations, and others.[54] The grassroots movement supporting divestment increased public awareness and focused attention among cities, towns, and parishes in countries that continued to reap huge trade benefits in South Africa. The divestment campaign also generated a complementary multimedia campaign that reached an even larger international audience. It focused international attention on the wrongful imprisonment of Nelson Mandela for 27 years. This showed the dramatic results possible when collective will for change crystallizes resolve for action.

Lack of diversity in South Africa's trading partners made the country a perfect target for sanctions. Most of South Africa's foreign trade remained with six major industrial

nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, and Japan), which supplied 79 percent of South Africa's imports ($8.2 billion) and purchased 78 percent of its exports ($12.4 billion).[55] Unlike Cuba, South Africa had no major political alliances that accorded it the means to combat sanctions. If Western nations chose to no longer trade with South Africa, Pretoria had no alternatives.

U. S. support for sanctions in South Africa was not substantial until 1986, when the Dellums bill supporting U. N. sanctions passed and became law over President Reagan's veto.[56] This effort grew beyond expectations when the U. S. Congress passed the Rangel Amendment to the Budget Reconciliation Act in 1987, which denied U. S. firms the ability to claim tax credits for taxes paid in South Africa.[57] Local grassroots effort also prompted state and local governments to become involved in the use of sanctions. By the end of 1991 at least twenty-eight states, twenty-four counties, and ninety-two cities had taken economic action against corporations with investments in South Africa, reportedly causing $20 billion of divestment.[58] These changes highlight the powerful force the common citizen can bring to bear on business and economic progress, despite existing governmental and international policies.

Jennifer Davis, director of the American Committee on Africa and the Africa Fund, candidly pointed out that although she actively campaigned for sanctions in the U. S. in 1966, she could not claim that they were either swift or overwhelmingly effective. Nevertheless, the application of sanctions, along with other complementary actions, brought about change after 35 years of effort. Davis cites key reports in the Washington Post which highlighted the impact of sanctions in South Africa, which cost an estimated $32 billion to $40 billion between 1985 and 1989.[59] Although sanctions were successful in South Africa, they did not work quickly. The obvious need in many cases for expediency leads to a host of concerns that require improvement in the future use of sanctions.

Several factors worked in harmony to bring about the demise of apartheid in South Africa. The most fundamental point is that opposition to apartheid did not solely cause the South African government to change. Rather it was the government's concern about South Africa's economic survival in a global economy that led to the collapse of apartheid and the establishment of an inclusive society.[61] An economy highly dependent on external sources, key investments from Western nations, expanded technological innovations, and lack of

substantial commodities such as oil made South Africa a vulnerable target of sanctions for any cause.[62] These factors paved the way for its citizens' plight to become a concern with the nations that supported South Africa's well-being.

LESSONS LEARNED

The U. S. experience with economic sanctions is diverse and rich with many lessons for future application. China, Cuba, and Yugoslavia provide examples where economic sanctions did not work to effect desired changes. The South African and Iraqi experiences are positive examples showing how multilateral sanctions can achieve desired ends, if applied quickly and decisively. As the remaining superpower, the U.S. must set the example by recognizing past triumphs and failures in imposing economic sanctions and building a legacy in diplomacy that complements domestic and international strategies for promoting peace and prosperity. A study of the successes and failures in these cases provide fundamental guidelines for future uses of economic sanctions in a world characterized by increasing global interdependence.

The most obvious lesson is that unilateral sanctions do not work. There is overwhelming consensus that unilateral sanctions have become a bankrupt approach, given current trends toward international economic interdependence.[63] In order to succeed, unilateral sanctions require a high level of dependency between the imposing actor and target recipient. The dependency for a particular good or service must be vital to the target's welfare and not available from alternate sources. This type of dependency is rare. The phenomenal growth of international trade offers numerous alternatives for commerce and exchange among nations. Cortright and Lopez conclude that the effectiveness of sanctions resides in their being harsh, comprehensive, immediate, and multilateral.[64] The Cuban experience resonates as a prime example that unilateral sanctions do not work. Cuba easily overcame U. S. sanctions with aid from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The same applied to the post-Cold War period, as our European allies continued to trade with Cuba despite U. S. efforts to impose its unilateral policy internationally. As a rule, unilateral sanctions amount to little more than statements or expressions of opposition, except in those instances in which the tie between the United States and the target is so extensive that the latter cannot adjust to an American cut-off.[65]

Economic sanctions must be a part of a comprehensive strategy. Sanctions should not be the sole means of achieving strategic goals. Whether they are coercive or preventive, sanctions will be most successful when they are part of a larger and coherent strategy, which includes other diplomatic means of persuasion and conflict resolution.[66] In the former Yugoslavia, the U. S., the European Union, and the U. N. acted only reluctantly, without total commitment and without exploring all possible alternatives to stop the violence. Each party essentially saw sanctions as a readily available means to address the situation without any consideration of other alternatives, such as force or more aggressive diplomacy. Sanctions alone could not solve the problem. Sanctions policy must take into consideration all parts of a problem. Such analysis must not be limited to economic interests, but must take into account the full range of political and security concerns.[67]

The 1990 Gulf Crisis is the best example of the use of sanctions as part of an overall strategy to defeat Iraq and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. The U.N. imposed sanctions before military actions in an effort to seek compliance without military force. These sanctions served as a means to solidify a multinational coalition that mobilized, deployed, and organized

a massive military operation. Sanctions also remained in effect during a highly successful military campaign. After Iraq's defeat, these sanctions became the cornerstone for assuring Iraq's compliance with U.N. resolutions concerning post war policies and conditions. Even so, the U.N. (and the U.S.) still can not assure Iraq's abandonment of WMD or inhumane treatment of Kurds.

When employed as part of a larger strategy, economic sanctions must be clearly targeted at a nation's government, not at its citizens. Sanctions employed against Iraq have had an adverse effect on innocent citizens who were not responsible for government actions that led to U. S. intervention. An imposing regime must appropriately identify a target country's leadership or elite as the focus for sanctions. Saddam Hussein's ruling Baath Party prospered while the Kurdish and Shiite factions in Iraq suffered the consequences from U.N. sanctions. Precedents have evolved in both U. S. and U. N. sanctions to take humanitarian measures to preclude suffering of innocent parties. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, a U. S. led effort, provided relief to the Kurdish population that had been oppressed by the Iraqi regime. The Iraqi Oil-for-Food Program is another example of humanitarian relief programs the U. N. has instituted to complement sanctions enforcement. The key challenge remains to

achieve a sensitive balance that minimizes external pressures on Iraqi citizens while imposing enough pressure economically to motivate an effective overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Economic sanctions require time for formulation, implementation, and execution. Clearly, the sanctioner must be prepared for the long haul when using them. Doxley estimates that sanctions take nearly three years to achieve their political goal.[68] Analysts are quick to point out, however, that the greatest impact of sanctions economically (and thus by extension politically) occurs in the first year.[69] In Cuba, 36 years of U. S. sanctions have not achieved any of the evolving political objectives sought. Bringing social change within South Africa required 35 years of effort, although the U. S. did not formally implement sanctions until 1986. Post-conflict sanctions have been in place in Iraq for over eight years without any apparent change in Iraqi policies or behavior. Implementation of a grand strategy that includes sanctions should identify reasonable benchmarks to alleviate fatigue on the sanctioning nation and supporting allies who have economic interests to consider. Allied fatigue with respect to Cuba and Iraq provide key examples. European countries are not willing to sacrifice their economic potential indefinitely in support of U. S. laws and policies that restrict their trade with Cuba.

Russia and China have vast financial interests in Iraq, which they can not recoup with the continuance of U. N. sanctions.

A nation must demonstrate absolute resolve when employing a strategy that contains economic sanctions.[70] Full commitment and unity of effort are essential for effective sanctions. No special exceptions or exemptions should exist for certain entities in the sanctioning nation. National interests must remain as the first priority rather than domestic politics. The case of China comes to mind as an example: The U. S. separated trade from its sanctions effort, which initially sought to alter China's policies on human rights, WMD proliferation, and trade. Nevertheless, U.S. domestic business interests undermined sanctions efforts and regarded China as a highly sought market for expansion.

Cases involving China, Cuba, Yugoslavia, and Iraq demonstrate the complexity of the post-Cold War environment. Significant challenges lie ahead. Richard Haass offered keen, in-depth analysis of U.S. sanctions on China, Cuba, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia. From this extensive review, he drew lessons which validate the observations noted in this review of sanctions' effectiveness. The greatest challenge lies in building strategies to overcome dictatorships like that

in Iraq. The key to success against this type of regime is to empower a population with a strong will for change, to neutralize authoritarian structures internally, to employ multilateral sanctions with strict enforcement, and to prepare to reinforce sanctions with military force as required.

These lessons apply to the U. S. as well as other nations using economic sanctions. They should aid the process of using them more effectively as part of a collaborative effort internationally. If sanctions are truly to succeed, they must do so within the context of the United Nations in a new century where global cooperation is essential to world peace and stability. Pertinent recommendations follow.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This analysis reviewed the effectiveness of economic sanctions imposed on several nations. These sanctions failed for several reasons: lack of enforcement by neighbor nations, negative effects on the economies of neighboring nations, suffering by innocent civilians rather than responsible leaders and elite, and factors unique to the fall of communism. A success story on sanctions in South Africa offers a different

perspective of sanctions that worked, although the time between implementation and achievement of the desired change was indeed protracted. Economic sanctions can work only through multilateral approach across a consortium of nations. The United Nations provides the framework for accomplishing this.

The complexity of nations' economies interacting globally requires worldwide cooperation and involvement in the effort to solve political problems. Though imperfect, the United Nations is the most effective means for formulating, implementing, executing, and enforcing sanctions. The newfound elimination of political stalemate in the U. N. Security Council between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union fostered new interest in U.N. reform.[72] The world no longer exists in a bipolar bind between two superpowers. The time is right to make the U.N. a more effective instrument for peace and diplomatic solutions to world problems.

In the foreseeable future, the United Nations offers the forum of choice for decisions on the scope, imposition, and enforcement of sanctions. Use of sanctions must include multilateral implementation by all member nations as provided in the U. N. Charter. Unilateral applications of sanctions should occur only rarely, if ever. However, the international

community should still recognize the sovereign right of individual nations to implement unilateral actions without U.N. endorsement when a country's vital or most critical interests warrant such action.[73] Multilateral measures must also include economic alternatives to offset collateral effects to regional neighbors and economic allies of the targeted nation. Lloyd Dumas, professor of economics at the University of Texas, supports creating a Council on Economic Sanctions and Peacekeeping within the U.N. Each member nation of the U.N. should provide routine profiles of their economies to develop a networked system for proper implementation of sanctions and assistance to impacted countries and their populations when approved by a resolution initiating economic sanctions. Economic sanctions operations, compliance, and control would then become an administrative function in a reformed U.N., with an appropriate staff and adequate resources for execution.[74] This newly formed element's mission would encompass all aspects of sanctions from implementation, execution, enforcement, and analysis of effects. It would seek to ensure they are fair, timely, and equitable in terms of international law. Ultimately, sanctions should further peaceful solutions to strained relations between nations.

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